In this article I argue that today’s social transformations are of such depth and significance that they demand a fundamental rethinking of the nature of pedagogy. I address 3 closely interwoven facets of change: the nature of subjectivity, where as citizens, workers, and cultural beings, we are more and more required to be users and players rather than spectators or delegates; the growing intensity and significance of life-world diversity in which the local is more multifarious and the global more proximate; and the changing means of production of meaning where the semantic web is increasingly ubiquitous and its meanings multimodal. The response of a New Learning must be multifaceted and holistic. More than reactive, the New Learning must be creative, itself an agent of change rather than merely reflective of change. The transformations wrought by the New Learning must be systemic, rhetorical, and evident in the everyday practices of teaching and learning. In the article I highlight just one of a number of possible pathways, and that is the shift from a psychological/cognitivist view of learning to an epistemological one.

Whether it be in the realms of civics, work, or everyday cultural life, we are in the midst of enormous change. To remain apt, education must reflect these changes. Maybe, there are even times and places where educators can lead change.

Take civics. For better or worse, the key phenomenon in the realm of civics is that the nation-state is shrinking. Whatever the root causes—small government conservatism, globalisation, or the new dynamics of a post–Cold War world—the realities of this change are felt everywhere.

The society of self-regulating community—civil society—is becoming a more significant locus of action and decision. The Internet is governed, not by any state, but through the community of experts and interested parties that is the World Wide Web Consortium. Diasporic communities are governed, not by home governments, but by highly distributed community organisations whose points of connec-
tion are common cultural principles. In education, we are witnessing the rise of community and private schooling and the self-managing public school, as well as the need for teaching to become an increasingly self-regulated profession. As the state contracts, there is no alternative to creating governance structures within the communities of practice of civil society.

With the shrinking of the state, a certain kind of society disappears, too. Compare the relationship of state and civil society today with the command societies of the 20th century—the communism of Lenin and Mao, the fascism of Hitler and interwar Japan, and the paternalistic regimentation of the West’s welfare state. When a greater capacity to decide and act is devolved to civil society, a higher level of participation and reflexivity is required of citizens.

So deep is this change that it extends even to the nature of personality. The society of the strong state established relationships of command and compliance at every level, not just in the state itself but in workplaces (the bosses and supervisors whose orders were to be obeyed), in homes (the heads of households who made decisions and disciplined), in schools (the orders of headmasters and teachers, mandated curricular content and tests of definitively correct answers).

Take that archetypical command personality Howard Roark, modern architect and towering individual in Ayn Rand’s procapitalist novel *The Fountainhead* (1952/1996). At the vanguard of unadorned modernism, he stands alone against the world, unwilling to compromise his designs, and for his singularity of purpose, he triumphs. At almost the same moment, anticapitalist Mexican artist Diego Rivera was painting the heroes of modernity on the murals of the Rockefeller Centre in New York. Overlooking the mighty works of modern man—the cities, the bridges, the industrial landscapes whose horizons are punctured by smokestacks—were the heroic engineer, the heroic architect, the heroic intellectual, the heroic political leader, the heroic gang-supervisor, and (his Rockefeller patrons also hoped) the heroic capitalist. Rivera was removed from the job when it became obvious that among the faces of the heroes was a likeness of Lenin. Notwithstanding 20th-century sensitivities to their ideological differences, Roark and Lenin were equally command personalities and in that sense substitutable in the tableau of modernism. Both left and right, in their time, lionised command personalities.

For every command personality, there had to be a multitude of unquestioning functionaries, and upon their compliance the system depended. The ideal citizen of the strong state was compliant; the ideal worker of the capitalist or communist industrial enterprise was compliant; the ideal learner in the classroom of disciplined knowledge was compliant.

Today, the command personality is an anachronism. At work, for instance, crude command structures are replaced by a more sophisticated cultural co-option—the co-option of teamwork, vision and mission, and corporate culture, in which everyone is supposed to personify the enterprise, to think and will and act the enterprise. Roark’s aesthetic insistence has become an archaism—he would let
his business fail before compromising on the rigorous modernism of his designs. “Any colour you like, so long as it’s black,” said another heroic command personality, Henry Ford. Today, there can be no entrepreneurial heroism because the customer is always right and products and services need to be customised to mesh with the multiple subjectivities of niche markets—the big SUVs, the smart sports cars, the spacious family cars, the microcars for crowded cities, cars of any hue and trim—so many permutations, in fact, that sometimes an individual order has to be placed before a vehicle is manufactured. Fordist mass production is displaced by today’s mass customisation.

In our lives as cultural beings as well, there has been a profound shift in the intersubjective balance of power. Take something as fundamental as narrative. In everyday family and community life, the narratives of gaming have become a bigger business than the narratives of Hollywood. From the most impressionable of ages, children of the Nintendo, PlayStation, and X-Box generation have become inured to the idea that they can be characters in narratives, capable of determining or at least influencing the story’s end. They are content with being no less than actors rather than audiences, players rather than spectators, agents rather than voyeurs, users rather than readers of narrative. Not content with programmed radio, they build their own playlists on their iPods. Not content with programmed television, they read the narratives of DVD and Internet-streamed video at varying depth (the movie, the documentary about the making of the movie) and dip into “chapters” at will. Not content with the singular vision of sports telecasting of mass television, they choose their own angles, replays, and statistical analyses on interactive digital television. Meanwhile, the autocreative potentials of the digital media and the “semantic web” have only begun, with phenomena such as blogging. These potentials create new economies of cultural scale, geographies of distribution, and balances of cultural power. The costs of owning the means of producing widely communicable meaning have been hugely reduced, and with this, the small and the different have become as viable as the large and the generic (Cope & Kalantzis, 2004).

Whether it be in the domains of governance, work, or cultural life, the command society is giving way to the society of reflexivity. Or so we might say in moments of strategic optimism. In moments of pessimism we might experience these same phenomena as fragmentation, egocentrism, randomness, ambiguity, and anarchy. And when this pessimism turns to fear, we might want to return to earlier, simpler command structures—in nations, workplaces, households, and schools.

Pessimists and optimists alike can agree that we are in the midst of a transformation that is creating new forms of subjectivity and new kinds of personality. These transformations can be viewed from within a systemic perspective and beyond it. From a systemic point of view, these are the kinds of governance structures, the kinds of organisations, and the kinds of people required today for the most conservative, small government, and proenterprise points of view. We hear these points of view ex-
pressed in the public rhetoric of innovation and creativity, the knowledge economy, and individual autonomy and responsibility. Notwithstanding the high-sounding rhetoric, these transformations when left to run their course may only legitimate and even exacerbate systemic inequities—iniquities, indeed.

History, however, is more open-ended than that. Inevitably, human systems are so complex that they allow possibilities outside the scope anticipated by their progenitors and apologists. For every moment when the ideologues of small government succeed in shrinking the state, there is another moment in which people learn the civilities of self-government in their various communities of practice; for every moment when command structures in workplaces are replaced by collaborationist structures, there is another moment in which people acquire the collaborative competencies of socially directed work; for every moment when compliant personalities are replaced by the egocentrism of individualism, there is another moment in which new relationships of codependence and mutual reliance are created and the bonds of sociability are extended and deepened. Whatever the domain, there is a shift in the balance of power and in the moral economy of agency that favours egalitarianism and liberty—and this, despite and beyond prevailing systems and structures of power. From this, something genuinely new could emerge.

Whether one’s agenda is to support today’s systems of governance, work, and culture or to create new and more equitable ones, subjectivity and agency loom larger than they did in the era of the command society. Yet, all too often, our institutions and practices of schooling reflect the epistemological frames of reference and personality types of the command society, in the communication patterns of classroom discourse, for instance, or the information architectures of curriculum, or the rigid expectations of “right” and “wrong” answers in testing regimes.

We educators have been struggling to develop a new dynamics of agency for a century now, starting with the progressivisms of John Dewey and Maria Montessori. One of the solutions to the problem of agency in learning has been a “constructivism” derived from a 20th-century psychological canon in which Piaget’s theories dominate. In the context of a command society, however, their emphasis was on the level and extent of receptivity at a particular age or at a particular cognitive stage. The raw materials of “intelligence” were biologised, and variations were accounted for in terms of individualised “capability” and the increments of what was supposed to be innate, universal development. Today, the cognitive sciences do a similar psychological job. Their agenda is to account for the mechanisms of receptivity more than for the mechanisms in which learned knowledge is genuinely made by conscious agency.

If, however, one follows and extends a line of thought begun by Vygotsky, other possibilities for pedagogy emerge. If knowledge is a psychological construct that is more social than individual, if learning is the stuff of active appropriation of the world in a social context, if educability amounts to more than equation of external transmission with individual receptivity, what then are the bases of a theory of pedagogy?
Building on Vygotsky, Bill Cope and I have been proposing a theory of learning that is grounded epistemologically rather than psychologically. By “epistemological,” we mean what we do to know (Kalantzis & Cope, 2004, 2005). As humans, we might be driven by the mystery of human consciousness, but the critical question is what we do with its drives. Here are some acts of knowing that we have been considering of late as a part of our Learning by Design research and development project: we experience (by immersion, making tacit connections in familiar or new contexts); we conceptualise (by abstracting, naming things, and developing explicit generalisations); we analyse (inferring and interpreting cause, effect, and human interest); we apply (by making an intervention in the world of useable things and meanings, be that intervention predictable and appropriate or innovative). In every one of these acts of knowing, we learn the world by doing something in the world.

The command society could never trust learners to be agents of knowing. Instead, they were the receptors of knowledge—although even this was a conceit of power, because now we understand the perennial role of the reader, the listener, or the viewer. We thought that they were receptors because this illusion also drove our politics, our workplaces, our public culture, and our pedagogy. In hindsight there was resistance as often as there was compliance, even if that resistance was branded subversion, laziness, or failure at school.

Today, we can remain under no such illusion. The increasingly critical self-governing structures of civil society, the tricks and tropes of the self-managing work team, the user-driven narratives of popular culture make any such illusions impossible. The children of Nintendo will simply walk away if the pedagogy served up to them by institutionalised schooling does not engage every fibre of their subjectivity. The workplace of the near future will simply be uncompetitive if its workers do not contribute their all, from their creative potential to their ability to maintain relationships of supple reflexivity across the myriad niche customers and affiliates. The cultures of the near future will ossify if they fail to leave space for the “readers” to follow their own proclivities and shape their own cultural ends.

The minute that one allows so much scope for agency, one finds oneself facing layers upon layers of difference. One discovers actually existing agencies in the massively plural and not the fabrications and falsifications of the command society with its one-people–one-state nationalism, of the regime of mass production and mass consumption, and of the pretensions to cultural homogeneity of the society of mass media and mass culture. The differences are material (class, locale), corporeal (race, gender, sexuality, ability/disability) and circumstantial (culture, life experience, interest, affinity). We can acknowledge these differences, perform neat demographic metrics, and, in the name of diversity, build programmes to suit group by group. Or we may think that we can, at least until we encounter a deeper difference that, in the interstices of these demographics or even solidly in the middle of each demographic, defies neat categorisation and prediction. These differences are manifest in the profoundly variable dispositions and sensibilities that one encounters from person to person. This is the stuff of the lifeworld, not individualised personality. Such differ-
ence is accountable in terms of the infinitely variable and therefore always uniquely complex range of sociocultural influences that come to bear on any one individual. The more we take agency for real, the more multifarious its manifestations become.

And to face all these agencies in one classroom! The solution of the command society was that of one teacher talking at the middle of the class, one textbook telling one narrative one chapter at a time, one test evaluating one way of knowing. The result was assimilation to the middle way or failure.

Constructivism blandly suggests that we bring agency into this picture. It is as if we can give all learners the same dose of agency, commensurate with their stage of the template of human developmentalism. But it is not just agency in the abstract that we have to harness. The complexity is such that the simple nostrums of constructivism serve us poorly indeed.

If it is to be at all relevant, the classroom of the reflexive society must allow alternative starting points for learning (what the learners perceive to be worth learning, what engages the particularities of their identities). It must allow for alternative forms of engagement (the varied experiences that need to be brought to bear on the learning; the different conceptual bents of learners; the different analytical perspectives that the learners may have on the nature of cause, effect, and human interest; and the different settings in which they may apply or enact their knowledge). It must allow for different learning styles (preferences, for instance, for particular emphases in knowledge making and patterns of engagement—experiential, conceptual, analytical, or applied). It must allow for different modalities in meaning making, embracing alternative expressive potentials for different learners. And it must allow for alternative pathways and destination points in learning.

This, broadly speaking, is an agenda for a New Learning (Kalantzis & Cope, 2001).

These are dangerous as well as exciting times. There are perils as well as enormous possibilities in a time of intensifying subjectivity and difference. Herein lies our responsibility as educators. More than reactive, the New Learning must be creative, itself a force for change rather than one merely reflective of change. And the transformations wrought by the New Learning must simultaneously be systemic, rhetorical, and evident in the everyday practices of teaching and learning.

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